This Is Not a New Normal. It’s Just the Old Normal Making a Comeback
States have been fighting trade wars as long as there have been states, trade, and wars.

States have been fighting trade wars as long as there have been states, trade, and wars.

Trade wars carry the fierce urgency of now, when the entire state system is at risk and the barriers that once seemed to separate power from wealth grow weaker every day. Yet to understand the predicament we must look beyond one country and the peculiarities of its leader. And unlike the hedgehog, who knows one big thing ― be that an economic, political, or legal perspective on the world ― analysts and practitioners of trade war must be like the fox who knows many things.
On Trade War takes an historical and interdisciplinary approach to explain how the world came to this juncture. It distinguishes among great powers by archetype: Commercial great powers such as Athens and England differ from political great powers such as Rome or the United States, and even more so from disengaged great powers such as Sparta and the Soviet Union. China is special: Beijing was once as disengaged as Moscow, and moved for decades towards London’s stance, but now increasingly resembles Washington.
Trade wars are historically more “normal” than the apparent separation of high from low politics in the latter half of the twentieth century. There are parallel ideas on the subject, for example, in the writings of Thucydides and Sunzi (or Sun Tzu).
Chapter 2 examines the theory and practice of trade war in the ancient Mediterranean to elaborate on the theme that Mercantilism is the default stance for most policymakers in most states at most times.
Chapter 3 summarizes the three ages of Mercantilism, emphasizing how the current iteration hearkens back to the original article by appealing to the interests of the most powerful states.
Chapter 4 examines Liberalism as a comprehensive ideology of foreign policy that goes beyond the doctrine of Free Trade to incorporate the associated values of peace and democracy.
Chapter 5 reviews the tensions between the Liberal ideology’s goal of establishing the rule of law, including sovereign equality, and states’ perennial interest in using trade as an instrument of influence.
The last two hundred years have been dominated by the successive hegemonies of the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as an interim period when Britain was no longer able to lead and the United States was not yet willing. Part II examines the similar arcs by which the power and influence of these two leaders rose and fell.
Chapter 6 reviews the similarities and differences between the British and American hegemons, focusing first on England’s wars and then its peacetime exercise of leadership-by-example in the trading system.
Chapter 7 covers the first German challenge to Anglo-American hegemony, culminating in World War I.
Chapter 8 reviews how the Nazis switched from a commercial to a partially disengaged strategy, joined by a Japanese empire whose own arc of policy ran along parallel lines.
Chapter 9 assesses the role of trade in and after the Cold War, emphasizing how it mattered less to the two principals than to their allies and clients.
The concluding section examines the U.S.-China conflict from several angles, stressing the American abdication of leadership.
Chapter 10 examines the similar U.S. and Chinese rises to power, presenting data on their market power and market exposure both globally and in their bilateral relationship.
Chapter 11 reviews these states' relationships with other great powers, emphasizing the uncertainty of alliances and multilateral bodies, as well as their increasing resort to trade sanctions.
Chapter 12 considers the preferential trade treatment that China and the United States extend to developing countries through programs and agreements, a field where China has pulled ahead.
Chapter 13 reviews where the U.S.-China trade war fits in the larger competition between these two states, with special emphasis on national security as a justification for trade restrictions.
You can now pre-order On Trade War from the Amazon websites in Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Amazon Global Store.
Pre-order is also available from Barnes & Noble and (for our Australian friends) from Readings.
Cambridge University Press will release the book in June.

“Craig VanGrasstek,” according to The Economist (January 22, 2000), “keeps a sharp eye on the politics of trade.” He worked in this field for more than thirty years before he turned to writing its history.
Dr. VanGrasstek has been a trade consultant since 1982, and headed Washington Trade Reports since 1985. The firm’s clients include corporations, government agencies, and such international organizations as the World Trade Organization, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and the World Bank. Dr. VanGrasstek has worked in over three dozen countries in five continents.
Dr. VanGrasstek received his doctorate in Politics from Princeton University in 1997. He also holds the degree of Master of Science in Foreign Service from Georgetown University (1983), and received a bachelor’s degree in International Relations from the University of Minnesota (1981). He taught trade policy at the American University’s School of International Service (1994-2001) and at the Harvard Kennedy School (2000-2022), as well as an innovative course on the fiction of foreign policy at Georgetown University and the Foreign Service Institute. He has also lectured at other universities, in the diplomatic academies of the United States and other countries, and at numerous training courses and seminars.
On Trade War can be read as the capstone of a trade history trilogy. In contrast to Dante’s Divine Comedy, however, in which the pilgrim passes through Inferno and Purgatorio before achieving Paradiso, this time the sequence is (from a free-trader’s perspective) in the other order. Many believed the world reached a new golden age in the twentieth century’s last decade, when the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) closely followed Communism’s collapse and the end of the Cold War. The expected peace dividend would allow all states to live in security, juridical equality, and prosperity. What could go wrong?
The hopes for Paradise were already disappointed by the time that the WTO commissioned its official history. The risks seemed greater still after Donald Trump was first elected in 2016, although one might still have held out hope for just a short stay in Purgatory. The failure of the Biden administration to restore the status quo ante, followed by the 2024 election of a man bent on revenge, put an end to that naive optimism.

The WTO’s official history was written under a cloud, at a time when trade specialists already had declining faith in the organization and the opportunity it presented. This is obliquely acknowledged in the third and fourth words of the title: The History and Future of the World Trade Organization (2013). Simply declaring that this body still had a future would not make it so, however, and it would have been intellectually dishonest not to take note of the challenges.
The theory of hegemonic stability frames the analysis. “But for the actions of two successive hegemons, each of which employed their power to create and maintain a regime of market-opening trade agreements,” as declared at the start, “it is doubtful that the legal and economic ideas on which the multilateral trading system is based would ever have moved beyond speculation and into practice.” The conclusions warned that a leading problem “that international society faces in this first half of the twenty-first century is how to handle a multilateral trading system in which there is no longer a clear hegemon,” and while the “facile solution would be to rely on the democracy of nations … to understand and act upon their shared interest in maintaining a system of open markets” that would demand “a great deal of sovereign and self-interested states.”
The book is available at https://www.wto-ilibrary.org/content/books/9789287042347#chapters
Systemic concerns only worsened when the United States transitioned from the system’s weary leader to its glowering disruptor. The first election of Donald Trump, and the chaos that followed, inspired Trade and American Leadership (2019).
Much of that book explains how the original proponents of the theory of hegemonic stability correctly identified the risks posed by reliance on one state’s continued competitiveness, even if they failed to anticipate how that state could postpone the showdown. They did not know that presidents Reagan through Obama would hold off the reckoning by making a series of strategic and tactical adjustments designed to accommodate the system to the American economy’s shifting interests, such as introducing the “new issues” of trade as services, investment, and intellectual property rights while also shifting to bilateral agreements.
That process eventually played out, then stalled, before Trump’s first election threw it into reverse. While no one could yet be sure whether his remaking of U.S. policy was a temporary aberration, even after he left office the signs were not good for restoration of the status quo ante.
The principal distinction between this book and its successor concerns the emphases placed on the domestic politics of trade. Those are far more prevalent in Trade and American Leadership than in On Trade War. The former book can be purchased from Cambridge University Press, Amazon, and Barnes & Noble (among others).
